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Mathematical Cognition
A Case of Enculturation
Richard Menary
Most thinking about cognition proceeds on the assumption that we are born with
our primary cognitive faculties intact and they simply need to mature, or be fine-
tuned by learning mechanisms. Alternatively, a growing number of thinkers are
aligning themselves to the view that a process of enculturation transforms our ba-
sic biological faculties. What evidence is there for this process of enculturation? A
long period of development, learning-driven plasticity, and a cultural environment
suffused with practices, symbols, and complex social interactions all speak in its
favour. In this paper I will sketch in outline the commitments of the enculturated
approach and then look at the case of mathematical cognition as a central ex-
ample of enculturation. I will then defend the account against several objections.
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1 Introduction
Since cognitive science took an ecological turn it
has been casting around for new frameworks in
which  to  conduct  its  main  business:  experi-
mental research. Those who have taken the eco-
logical  turn  are  convinced  that  classical  and
brain-bound frameworks don’t provide the ne-
cessary  conceptual  and  experimental  tools  re-
quired to make sense of cognition in the wild
(Hutchins 1995).  A  number  of  alternative
frameworks have been proposed, with embodied
cognition the most frequently adopted. The the-
oretical framework one uses to understand cog-
nition has profound empirical consequences for
scientific  practice.  For  example,  it  influences
what we consider to be the relevant phenomena
of interest, what questions we ask about them,
how we design and perform experiments,  and
how we interpret results (Beer 2000). The theor-
etical  framework  of  classical  computation,  for
example,  approaches cognitive processing as a
matter of input represented symbolically, which
is  then  syntactically  processed  according  to
stored knowledge that the system has. It pro-
poses a single “sandwich style” layer of cognit-
ive  processing,  involving  input,  computation,
and output (Hurley 2010). 
The theoretical framework of CI (cognitive
integration;  Menary 2007)  proposes something
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altogether  different:  multiple  cognitive  layers
where  neural,  bodily,  and  environmental  pro-
cesses all conspire to complete cognitive tasks.
Although the framework is unified by a dynam-
ical systems description of the evolution of pro-
cessing in the hybrid and multi-layered system,
it recognises the novel contributions of the dis-
tinct processing profiles of the brain, body, and
environment.  Furthermore,  the  CI  framework
explains our cognitive capabilities for abstract
symbolic thought by giving an evolutionary and
developmental  case  for  the  plasticity  of  the
brain  in  redeploying  older  neural  circuits  to
new, culturally specific functions—such as read-
ing, writing, and mathematics (Menary 2014). I
call this a process of enculturation. 
This paper seeks to outline the phylogenetic
and ontogenetic conditions for the process of en-
culturation. It will take mathematical cognition,
particularly the evolutionary basis for mathemat-
ical cognition, as a core example of enculturation.
In so doing, I hope to have given an account of
why enculturation exists, how it happens, and in
what ways it can be defended against objections.
In the first section I will explore the relationship
of CI to cognition embodied, embedded, enacted,
extended (4E) cognition and then explain why so-
cial and cultural practices are important to the
process of enculturation. In the  second section I
will outline the core concepts required to make
sense of enculturation: continuity, transformation,
novelty, and uniqueness. The third section will in-
troduce the example of mathematical cognition,
moving from the evolutionary basis for numeros-
ity and numerical cognition to the precise opera-
tions of mathematics. The fourth section will give
an account of mathematical cognition as a case of
enculturation. In the  final section I outline two
possible objections and respond to them.
2 Where does CI sit in the 4E 
landscape?
Traversing the 4E landscape one rises from the
lowlands  of  weakly  embodied  and  embedded
cognitive science to the giddy heights of strong
embodiment and embedding.  Embodied cogni-
tion is the thesis that at least some of our cog-
nitive  states  and processes  are constituted by
bodily processes that are not brain-bound. Em-
bedded cognition is the thesis that our cognitive
systems  are  located  in  and  interact  with  the
surrounding  physical  and  social  environment.
Enactive and extended approaches to cognition
inhabit the rarefied atmosphere of the strongly
embodied and embedded peaks. However, there
are important differences between enaction and
extension and between those variants and CI.
To determine where CI and enculturation sit in
the 4E landscape, I will use a dimensional ana-
lysis I first introduced in Menary (2010).
Embodied mind
Embodied mind weak: the mind/brain
is  embodied  (compatible  with
internalism/individualism  Smart 1959;
Stich 1983)  
Embodied mind moderate: some of our
mental and cognitive processes and states
depend1 upon our non-neural body (Galla-
gher 2005; Gallese 2008)  
Embodied  mind  strong:  some  of  our
mental and cognitive processes and states
are constituted by processes of the body
acting in  and on the environment (com-
patible with enactivism Varela et al. 1991,
and CI Menary 2007)
Embedded mind
Embedded mind weak: All the percep-
tual  inputs  to  and  behavioural  outputs
from cognitive  systems  are  found in  the
environment  (compatible  with  internal-
ism/individualism Adams & Aizawa 2008;
Rupert 2009)  
Embedded  mind  moderate:  Mental
and  cognitive  states  and  processes  are
scaffolded or causally depend upon the en-
vironment (Sterelny 2003;  Wheeler 2005)  
Embedded mind strong:  Some mental
and cognitive processes and states are in-
tegrated  with  environmental  states  and
processes into a single system (compatible
with extended mind  Clark 2008,  this col-
lection; Menary 2007; Rowlands 2010)
1 Here we might take dependence simply to be a causal, and not a
constitutive,  relation.  Perhaps  my  gesturing  in  a  particular  way
causes my recalling a word.
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Weakly  embodied  mind is  just  the  old  thesis
that the mind is identical to the brain. One can
be an individualist and hold to this form of em-
bodiment, and I won’t consider the implications
of the view here. The work of some2 embodied
cognition researchers will fall under the moder-
ate  sense  of  embodiment.  For  example,  those
who attempt to  show that  concepts or  word-
meanings are causally dependent upon sensori-
motor  areas  of  the  brain  (Glenberg 2010;
Gallese 2008) commit  to a moderate  sense of
embodiment. The strong sense of  embodiment
focuses on how cognition is constituted by bod-
ily interaction with the environment, and I shall
focus on the discussion here. CI and enactivism
occupy this region of the environment, but with
different emphases on the nature of the interac-
tion and the evolutionary continuity of simple
and complex cognitive systems. CI also occupies
the strongly-embedded region, but I shall deal
with the relation between CI and cognitive ex-
tension in the next sub-section.
Enactivism (excluding its radical variant)3
allows that even simple living systems are cog-
nitive.  Enactivists  are  committed  to  the  con-
tinuity  of  life  and mind and so they propose
cognitive and even mental states and processes4
for much simpler biological systems than would
CI (Varela et al. 1991).5 Whilst I am sympath-
etic with the commitment to continuity between
simple cognitive systems and complex cognitive
systems,  it  is  questionable whether  we should
argue  that  simply  being  a  living  organism
provides sufficient cognitive complexity for con-
scious experience and sense (or meaning) mak-
ing.
CI does not require us to think that com-
plex cognitive and mental phenomena, such as
conscious experience, are shared by all living or-
2 One could look at a classic paper on mind/brain identity such as
Smart (1959).
3 See  Thompson (2007)  for  an  account  of  the  life-mind  continuity,
Stewart et  al. (2010)  for  a  volume  dedicated  to  enactivism,  and
Hutto & Myin (2013) for a self-proclaimed radical variant.
4 See for example Barbaras (2010), which argues that to live is to have
intentional consciousness of living.
5 Interestingly, radical enactivsts appear to agree with CI on this issue; see
Hutto &  Myin (2013,  p.  35).  However,  the  radicals  have  a  problem
bridging the gap between basic cognitive processes and enculturated ones,
since they think that meaning, or content, can only be present in a cognit-
ive system when language and cultural scaffolding is present (Hutto &
Myin 2013). That, of course, doesn’t sit well with evolutionary continuity.
ganisms whatever their complexity or simplicity.
This is to assume that the properties of com-
plex  cognitive  systems  will  be  found  even  in
very simple cognitive systems. According to CI,
this gets things the wrong way round: there is a
continuity from very simple systems that inter-
act with their environments, by having mechan-
isms  that  track  or  detect  salient  features  of
their  environments,  to  complex  systems  that
have  a  wider  range  of  cognitive  capabilities
(traits) including memory, inference, communic-
ation, problem solving, social cognition, and so
on. By contrast a phylogeny of cognitive traits
would  show  the  distribution  of  those  traits
(across species) and help us to understand both
the  evolutionary  pressures  that  produce  more
complex kinds of cognitive systems and the in-
novations that bring about new traits.6 
CI provides a phylogenetic and ontogenetic
basis for when bodily interactions are cognitive
processes.  Along  with  niche  constructionists
(Laland et al. 2000), CI maintains a phylogeny
of hominid cognition in terms their active em-
bodiment  in  a  socially  constructed  cognitive
niche. Ontogentically, neonates acquire cognitive
abilities to create, maintain, and manipulate the
shared  cognitive  niche,  including  tools,  prac-
tices,  and  representational  systems.  Cognitive
processing  often  involves  these  online  bodily
manipulations of the cognitive niche, sometimes
as  individuals  and  sometimes  in  collaboration
with others. CI has a unique position on the 4E
landscape, because it is the first framework to
propose that the co-ordination dynamics of in-
tegrated  cognitive  systems  are  jointly  orches-
trated  by  biological  and  cultural  functions.
What,  though,  are  the  cultural  functions  in
question?
2.1 Cognitive practices as cultural 
practices
Both CI and extended mind (EM) occupy the
strong embedding region, but they do so in dif-
ferent  ways.  Here  I  will  differentiate  CI  as  a
thesis of  enculturation from Clark’s organism-
6 See for example Sterelny’s cognitive phylogeny in Sterelny (2003) and God-
frey-Smith’s complexity thesis in Godfrey-Smith (1996). See MacLean et al.
(2012) for an overview of the problems for a comparative phylogeny.
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centred approach to EM. Cognitive integration
is a model of how our minds become encultur-
ated. Enculturation rests in the acquisition of
cultural practices that are cognitive in nature.
The practices transform our existing biological
capacities,  allowing  us  to  complete  cognitive
tasks,  in ways that our unenculturated brains
and bodies will not allow. Cultural practices are
patterns  of  action  spread  out  across  cultural
groups (Roepstorff 2010;  Hutchins 2011;  Men-
ary 2007,  2010,  2012). Cognitive practices7 are
enacted by creating and manipulating informa-
tional structures8 in public space. This can be
by creating shared linguistic content and devel-
oping it through dialogue, inference, and narrat-
ive; or it can be by bodily creating and manipu-
lating environmental structures, which might be
tools or public and shared representations (or a
combination of both). Examples of linguistically
mediated action include self-correction by use of
spoken (or  written)  instructions,  co-ordinating
actions among a group, or solving a problem in
a group by means of linguistic interaction. Ex-
amples of creating and manipulating public and
shared representations include using a graph to
represent quantitative relationships; using a dia-
gram  to  represent  the  layout  of  a  circuit  or
building; using a list to remember a sequence of
actions; or to solve an equation, to mathematic-
ally model a domain, to make logical or causal
connections between ideas, and so on. Practices
can be combined into complex sequences of ac-
tions where the physical manipulation of tools is
guided  by  spoken  instructions,  which  are  up-
dated across group members. A simple example
of  a  group  brainstorming  with  one  member
writing out the answers would be an example of
a complex of collaborative cognitive practices.9
7 I don’t mean to suggest that there can’t be other effects of cog-
nitive practices, but since practices are just the cultural formal-
isation of patterns of action across a population, or group, cog-
nitive  practices  are  tied directly  to  these  patterns  of  action.  I
can’t  provide  a  detailed  origin  account  for  cognitive  practices
here, but see Menary (2007, Ch. 5) for an early attempt to do so.
However,  the  account  of  mathematical  cognition  I  give  in  the
next two sections provides an example  of how such an account
would be likely to look.
8 The primary cases I am thinking of are public systems of representa-
tion, including spoken language. However, I don’t want to rule out
cases involving tools, bodily gestures, artistic or bodily adornments,
and the intelligent use of space and objects.
9 For  two very good overviews  of  collective  or  group cognition see
Theiner (2013) and Huebner (2013).
Cognitive  practices  are  culturally  endowed
(bodily)  manipulations  of  informational  struc-
tures. 
Practices  govern  how  we  deploy  tools,
writing  systems,  number  systems,  and  other
kinds  of  representational  systems  to  complete
cognitive  tasks.  These  are  not  simply  static
vehicles  that  have  contents;  they  are  active
components embedded in dynamical patterns of
cultural practice. Practices are public, and they
are also  embodied and enacted.10 We embody
practices:  they become the ways in  which we
act, think, and live. They structure our lifeways
(although not exclusively). 
CI does not deny that much thinking takes
place offline in the brain, but it does take the
online and interactive mode of  thought to be
adaptive. Again, this line of thought has pre-
cursors,11 but  CI,  uniquely,  takes  interactive
thought as a basic category,12 which is then scaf-
folded by culturally evolved practices. Practices
stabilise and govern interactive thought across a
population  of  similar  phenotypes.  The  stable
patterns of action can then be inherited by the
next generation, because the practices have be-
come settled and are part of the developmental
niche in which the minds of the next generation
grow.  Our  brains  co-adapted  to  the  stable
spread of practice and its role in ontogeny—res-
ulting  in  the  slow  evolution  of  the  cultural
brain. 
The  focus  upon  practice  and  culture
marks cognitive integration out from variants of
extended cognition,  such as  Clark’s  organism-
centred  approach to  extension  (2008).  Clark’s
organism centred approach takes the assembly
of extended cognitive systems to be controlled
by  the  discrete  organism,  and  brain,  at  the
centre of it. He thereby reduces the role of cul-
tural practices in large or small groups of organ-
10 Jennifer Windt helpfully pointed out that practices can be thought of as
public, because they are embodied and enacted. I think that this is just
right: practices are patterns of action spread across a population. How-
ever, I am inclined to think that practices are not simply reducible to the
bodily actions of individuals. Whilst doing long multiplication requires a
bodily action of me, what I am doing cannot be described exclusively in
terms of those bodily actions. The practice is a population, or group level
phenomenon, not an individual one.
11 The classical pragmatists, particularly Peirce and Dewey, held that
thought was interactive. See Menary (2011) for a description of prag-
matist approaches to thought, experience and the self.
12 See Menary (2007, Ch. 5), where I make a detailed evolutionary case.
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isms in the explanation of cognitive assembly.
“Brains  are  special,  and  to  assert  this  need
mark no slippery-slope concession to good old-
fashioned internalism as an account of mind. It
is fully consistent with thinking (as I do) that
Hutchins is absolutely right to stress the major
role of transmitted cultural practices in setting
the scene for various neurally-based processes of
cognitive  assembly”  (Clark 2011,  p.  458).  On
Clark’s  view,  cultural  practices  only  set  the
scene for the real work of integration to be done
by  the  brain.  Whilst  it  is  arguable  whether
Clark’s position is a return to “good old fash-
ioned internalism,”  he certainly  does not  give
cultural  practices  a  central  role  in  assembling
and orchestrating cognitive systems.13 Hutchins,
by contrast, is committed to a full-blooded en-
culturated approach: 
[t]he ecological assemblies of human cogni-
tion  make  pervasive  use  of  cultural
products. They are always initially, and of-
ten subsequently, assembled on the spot in
ongoing cultural practices. (2011, p. 445)
CI is the only variant of strong embedding (in-
cluding  EM)  to  explain  the  role  of  cultural
practices in assembling integrated cognitive sys-
tems. Cognitive practices are inherited as part
of the developmental niche and have profound
transformative effects on our cognitive abilities.
This leads us to the main concepts required to
understand these transformations as a process
of enculturation. 
3 Enculturation: The main concepts
In this  section I  define and explain the main
concepts required to understand enculturation,
other than the already explored concepts of in-
tegration and practice. I will develop the con-
cepts  of  evolutionary  continuity,  behavioural
and neural plasticity, transformation and innov-
13 If  this  is  an accurate portrayal  of  Clark’s  position (and I have
tried to carefully use his own words) then, despite his protesta -
tions to the contrary, it appears to be a return to internalism, at
least for the most central  and important cognitive processes. If
the brain carrys out all the important cognitive operations, then
Clark’s  position  would  be  a  moderate  embedded  cognition  for
core cognitive abilities and an extended approach only to some of
the more peripheral cases.
ation, or novelty and uniqueness. In particular I
will emphasise the phylogenetic and ontogenetic
bases for modern human cognitive capacities. 
3.1 Evolutionary continuity
The concept of evolutionary continuity results
from the fact that evolution occurs gradually
with  complex  structures  evolving  over  many
generations.  Over  long  periods  of  time  these
gradual changes accumulate, resulting in large
differences. Consequently, changes to a pheno-
type occur in slow cumulative steps over long
periods of time and do not appear in a single
mutational  step. Evolutionary  continuity  de-
mands that modern human minds evolved from
earlier  archaic  variants.  Doubtless  modern
minds differ from archaic minds in important
respects,  but  these  differences  must  have
evolved over long periods of time, through slow
cumulative  mutational  changes  to  the  geno-
type. Even so, we should expect some of our
archaic traits to remain, and for more modern
variants to be built on top of them. One obvi-
ous example of this is the evolution of the hu-
man brain. 
The evolution of the human brain can, to
some extent, be seen in the gradual increase of
cranial capacity, but some of the most import-
ant changes have been in the reorganisation of
cortical  circuitry  and  interconnectivity  (Hoff-
man 2014). Although the evolution of the hu-
man brain can be understood in terms of  in-
creasing  encephalization  and  increased  con-
nectivity  between  brain  regions,  the  human
brain has essentially the same set of structures
as  any  other  primate  brain.14 Modern  brains
evolved from archaic brains and share the same
evolutionary constraints as other primates: “the
similarity in brain design among primates, in-
cluding  humans,  indicates  that  brain  systems
among related species are internally constrained
and that the primate brain could only evolve
within the context of a limited number of po-
tential  forms”  (Hoffman 2014,  p.  5).  Modern
minds are still partly archaic. 
14 “Although species vary in the number of cortical areas they posses, and in
the patterns of connections within and between areas, the structural organiz-
ation of the primate neocortex is remarkably similar” (Hoffman 2014, p. 4).
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It  is  important  to  think  of  evolutionary
continuity as running from archaic to modern.
We should try to avoid anthropomorphic tend-
encies  to  project  modern  cognitive  capacities
backwards into the hominin lineage or across to
primate species. For example, humans are excel-
lent social cognisers, but it does not follow from
this  that  we should expect  other  primates  to
have a theory of mind.15 The evolutionary pres-
sures under which humans evolved and the ca-
pacities for complex social cognition might have
been  very  different  from  those  under  which
other  primates  evolved.  Consequently,  we
should  be  searching  for  archaic  precursors  to
modern  cognitive  capacities.  For  example,  we
might  expect  that  given  the  increasing  social
pressures in hominid social groups there would
be  precursors  to  modern  social  cognition  and
that these precursors would have been adaptive
solutions (Shultz et  al. 2012).  Modern human
social cognition would then be an evolutionary
consequence of increasing variation in the com-
plexity  of  social  organisation  and  interaction
(Sterelny 2003).
I am committed to another sense of con-
tinuity: that between biology and culture. Cul-
ture is not, as a category, distinct from the bio-
logical. Although culture is sometimes thought
of as floating free of our biological nature and
sometimes as being highly constrained by it, I
shall assume that genes and culture co-evolve16
mutually, influencing and constraining one an-
other. Therefore I shall accept no culture–bio-
logy dualism in this paper. Indeed I shall adopt
a cultural inheritance model of cognitive evolu-
tion (of the niche construction kind). However, I
shall always do so with archaic origins in mind.
Archaic  origins  matter  to  cognitive  evolution
and they matter to the way our brains develop
during the lifespan.17 
15 Indeed, it is questionable whether humans deploy a theory of mind,
or at least, perhaps they only do so on rare occasions (Hutto 2008;
Andrews 2012). Andrews has also argued that we may share a num-
ber of “mind reading” strategies with other primates that don’t in-
volve theory of mind (2012).
16 See below for a niche construction account of gene-culture co-
evolution. I favour such an account because it helps us to un-
derstand  how  a  developmental  niche  could  have  cumulative
downstream  evolutionary  effects  on  phenotypes  (Sterelny
2003).
17 They matter because they are part of the developmental biases that
produce a robust phenotype.
In  the  “modern  synthesis”  there  is  only
one line of inheritance, and that is genetic in-
heritance.  More  recently,  biologists  (Odling-
Smee et al. 2003) have proposed that there are
other lines of inheritance: ecological inheritance
and  cultural  inheritance  (Boyd &  Richerson
2005). Many organisms construct the niche in
which they live, mate, hunt, and die. Niche con-
structors modify the ancestral environment, and
these modifications are bequeathed to the next
generation.  Modifications  encompass  physical
alterations,  such  as  living  in  mounds  or  con-
structing  hives,  as  well  as  cultural  artefacts,
practices,  and  institutions.  Over  long  periods
these alterations to the niche can have profound
effects on the phenotype. For example, the ubi-
quitous niche constructions of termites, burrows
and mounds, have profoundly altered their mor-
phology and behaviour (Turner 2000). 
Humans  are  also  ubiquitous  niche-con-
structors.  They  physically  alter  their  environ-
ment and they also epistemically, socially, and
culturally  engineer  the  environment  (Sterelny
2003,  2010;  Menary 2007).  Humans  are  born
into  a  highly  structured  cognitive  niche  that
contains  not  only  physical  artefact,  but  also
representational  systems  that  embody  know-
ledge (writing systems, number systems, etc.);
skills  and  methods  for  training  and  teaching
new  skills  (Menary &  Kirchhoff 2014);  and
practices for manipulating tools and representa-
tions.  Inherited  cultural  capital  is  a  real  and
stable feature of the socio-cultural environment,
including a great variety of knowledge systems,
skills, and practices across a variety of domains
of  human  action.  As  such,  human  cultural
niches provide neonates with rich developmental
niches. It is in these developmental niches that
humans acquire cognitive practices. 
Cognitive  practices  are  products  of  cul-
tural evolution, evolving over faster timescales
than biological evolution. Writing systems, for
example, are only thousands of years old; con-
sequently, it is highly unlikely that there is  a
“reading  gene”  or  even  an  innate  specialised
“reading module.” This is important: cognitive
capacities for reading and writing, mathematics,
and other culturally recent forms of  cognition
could  not  be  biological  adaptations  (that
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evolved over long periods of time). The times-
cales for their evolution are too short. It follows
that the capacity for culturally recent forms of
cognition  must  be  acquired  through  learning
and training. 
Although there are no innate  specialized
modules for these recent forms of cognition, cor-
tical  circuits  with  which  we  are  endowed
through evolution  are  transformed to perform
new culturally recent cognitive functions, even
though they evolved to perform different func-
tions. Recent cognitive innovations aside, there
are good reasons to expect that evolution has
driven us to think by interacting with the envir-
onment and that this is adaptive (Sterelny 2003
2012;  Menary 2007;  Wheeler &  Clark 2008).
However, it is the scaffolding of cultural prac-
tices  that  orchestrates  the  interactions—as  in
the case of written language and mathematics. 
Structured socio-cultural niches have had
profound evolutionary consequences in the hom-
inin lineage. Structured niches have co-evolved
with  human  phenotypic  and  developmental
plasticity. We have evolved to be a behaviour-
ally plastic species (Sterelny 2012) as well as a
cultural species. In this co-evolution we have de-
veloped  all  manner  of  skills,  practices,  and
activities. Why, though, are we so peculiarly be-
haviourally  plastic?  One  good  answer  to  this
question is that human behavioural and devel-
opmental plasticity is an adaptive response to
the variability and contingency of the local en-
vironment (Finlayson 2009; Sterelny 2003, 2012;
Davies 2012). This is an alternative to the view
that  we are adapted to a pleistocene hunting
and gathering environment—a view relied upon
by many evolutionary psychologists (Barkow et
al. 1992). 
Critical  to  a  co-evolutionary  account  of
cultural  practices  is  the  evolution  of  human
plasticity. Given that there is such a variety of
cultural activity, we need an account of human
evolution that will allow for variability in hu-
man behaviour. Second, we need a model that
explains how innovations in our cultural niche
are  inherited  and  propagated,  leading  to
changes in behaviour over time. The niche con-
struction  model  explains  how  both  of  these
causal factors could come into play. In the sub-
sections below, I outline the importance of be-
havioural and neural plasticity, the concept of
transformation,  and  those  of  novelty  and
uniqueness. 
3.2 Behavioural and neural plasticity
In evolutionary terms,  humans are capable  of
developing  a  wide  range  of  skills  that  allow
them to cope with a wide variety of  environ-
ments  (and their  contingencies).  For  example,
even  where  skills  are  (broadly)  of  the  same
type,  such  as  hunting,  they  will  vary in  how
they cope with the differences in local environ-
ments—think of the differences in environments
between  Aboriginal  hunters  in  the  Pilbara
desert,  hunter-gatherers  in  the  Central  Amer-
ican rainforests, and Inuit seal-hunters (Sterelny
2003, p. 167).
Development  is  extended  in  modern  hu-
mans relative to other species. Humans take a
long time to learn how to walk and talk, and
much,  much  longer  to  develop  fine-grained
manual and cognitive skills such as reading and
writing. Other primates have much faster devel-
opmental timescales. While this might make hu-
mans  more  dependent  on  their  caregivers  for
longer, it also allows them to refine skills and
acquire a greater array of them before entering
adulthood.
Through  cultural  inheritance,  knowledge,
skills, and artefacts are passed on to the next
generation,  but  learning  environments  and
learning techniques are also passed on so that
the next generation can acquire and be trans-
formed by the inherited cultural capital.  This
last  point  is  important  for  our  purposes,  be-
cause developmentally plastic humans need scaf-
folded  learning  environments  in  which  to  de-
velop.18
How, though, are we capable of acquiring
these  new cultural  capacities  in  development?
Through neural plasticity. Rather than the pro-
cess of synaptogenesis or lesion-induced plasti-
city,19 the kind of plasticity I will discuss here is
18 If the cognitive abilities for manipulating artefacts and representa-
tions are not innate, then a scaffolded learning environment helps to
explain how we acquire them.
19 Many neurological studies of plasticity focus on synaptogenesis, the
florid growth of grey matter and then the consequent pruning, or the
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what I call learning driven plasticity (see Men-
ary 2014). Learning driven plasticity (LDP) can
result in both structural and functional changes
in  the  brain.  Structurally,  LDP can  result  in
new connections  between existing  cortical  cir-
cuits. Functionally, LDP can result in new rep-
resentational capacities (the ability to represent
public symbolic representations such as alpha-
bets and numerals) and new cognitive abilities,
such  as  mathematics,20 reading,  and  writing
(Dehaene 2009; Ansari 2012). It should come as
no surprise that learning drives structural and
functional changes in the brain, given the exten-
ded developmental  period in  humans and the
late development of the cortex (Thatcher 1991).
The brain changes, not just because of matura-
tion, but also because of learning: 
[w]hen children learn to read, they return
from  school  ‘literally  changed’.  Their
brains will never be the same again. (De-
haene 2009, p. 210)
Famously, Dehaene argues that a region of the
occipito-temporal  junction (which he calls  the
VWFA, visual word form area) that is part of a
wider network for recognising faces, objects, and
even abstract shapes (such as chequer patterns),
alters its function to recognise written symbols
in alphabets and even logographic scripts such
as  kanji  (Dehaene 2009).  This  is  due  to  the
plasticity of that area of the brain, where the
functional shift is due to scaffolded learning.21
“Scanning  of  ‘ex-illiterate’  adults  who learned
to  read  during  adulthood  has  demonstrated
that the VWFA is highly plastic, even in adults,
and  quickly  enhances  its  response  to  letter
strings as soon as the rudiments of reading are
in  place”  (Dehaene &  Cohen 2011,  p.  259).
Even those who are not convinced that a spe-
cialised  region  for  “word  recognition”  is  ac-
quired once we learn to read admit that the oc-
synaptic  death of  many of  those  neurons in  the so-called critical
period of childhood. There are a large number of studies of neural
damage, often by stroke or injury, where cortical circuitry becomes
damaged and its function impaired, but where other areas of the cor-
tex can take on the impaired function. (See Huttenlocher 2002 for an
overview.)
20 I will be defending an account of mathematical cognition in section 4.
21 See Menary (2014) for a discussion of plasticity and the VWFA.
cipito-temporal  junction  is  part  of  a  reading
and writing circuit (e.g., Price & Devlin 2011).
We have evolved to be phenotypically and
developmentally plastic. This is in no small part
due to the plasticity of our brains. Our develop-
mentally  plastic  brains  exhibit  learning-driven
plasticity. When the brain is coupled to a highly
scaffolded learning environment it is profoundly
transformed, structurally and functionally, and
consequently we are cognitively transformed in
the profoundest way. 
3.3 Transformation
The transformation thesis can be given a simple
formulation:  cognitive  transformations  occur
when the development of the cognitive capacit-
ies of an individual are sculpted by the cultural
and social  niche  of  that  individual.  Cognitive
transformations result from our evolved plasti-
city  and  scaffolded  learning  in  the  develop-
mental  niche.  In  the  previous  sub-sections  an
account was given of the effects of cultural in-
heritance  and  niche  construction  on  hominid
evolution.  The  result  is  phenotypic  plasticity,
and  in  the  cognitive  case  the  co-evolution  of
neural plasticity and scaffolded learning. How-
ever, the point of the transformation thesis is to
drill down into the process of acquiring know-
ledge, skills, and cognitive abilities via learning-
driven plasticity and scaffolded learning. It does
this by showing how transformations are a res-
ult of the role of cognitive practices in develop-
ment. Practices structure the niche; they trans-
form plastic brains via learning driven plasticity
and result in new cognitive abilities. 
During the learning and training of a skill,
such as flaking an arrowhead, or a shot in ten-
nis or cricket, we are guided by the norms for
the  correct  actions  that  make  up  the  skilled
practice. A parallel case can be made for cognit-
ive abilities such as mathematics. The neophyte
mathematician gains mastery over the cognitive
norms22 by  which  numerals,  operators,  and
other symbols are created and manipulated. Vy-
gotsky expresses this in the claim that children,
“master the rules in accordance with which ex-
22 For an account of cognitive norms see Menary (2007), Chapter
6.
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ternal signs must be used” (Vygotsky 1981, pp.
184–185).  Initially  the  child  masters  the  cre-
ation and deployment of spoken linguistic signs
(and later written signs) through the scaffolding
of parents and caregivers. However, this process
is not simply a matter of gaining new represent-
ations; it is also one of gaining new abilities.
Neophytes  go  through  a  process  of  dual-
component transformation: they learn how to un-
derstand and deploy public symbolic representa-
tions and they learn how to create and manipu-
late inscriptions of those symbols in public space
(Menary 2010). In so doing, they learn mathem-
atical and linguistic concepts and they learn how
to manipulate inscriptions to complete cognitive
tasks.  When  learning  the  manipulative  tech-
niques, the first transformation is one of the sens-
ory-motor abilities for creating and manipulating
inscriptions: we learn algorithms like the partial
products algorithm23 and this is an example of the
application of a cognitive practice. This is some-
thing we learn to do on the page and in the con-
text of a learning environment, in public space,
before we do it in our heads. Our capacities to
think have been transformed, but in this instance
they are capacities to manipulate inscriptions in
public space. This is a way of showing that the
transformation of our cognitive capacities has re-
cognisably public features. This ought not to be a
surprise, given that the cognitive niche is socially
and culturally constructed and is structured by
socio-cultural practices. Symbol systems, such as
those for written language and mathematics, are
not impermanent scaffolds that we shrug off in
adulthood, but are permanent scaffolds that in-
delibly alter the architecture of cognition.24 
The transformatory position is  quite  dif-
ferent from that held by Clark or Sterelny. In
particular it holds that our basic cognitive cap-
abilities  are  transformed  in  development  and
that the dual component transformation results
in a distinct functional redeployment of neural
circuitry and new abilities to bodily manipulate
structures in public space. Cognitive tasks can
be completed by manipulating written symbols
in public space or by off-line strategies for com-
pleting  algorithms,  or  a  combination  of  both.
23 I’ll look at this example in detail in section 5.
24 I take this issue up again in section 4.1.
This conclusion sits happily with the idea that
thought  is  interactive  and  governed  by  prac-
tices. 
The main  difference  between the  position
outlined  here  and  Clark’s  (e.g.,  2008),  is  that
Clark  does  not  explain  cognitive  extension  in
terms of the transformation of basic cognitive re-
sources  during  development  in  a  socio-cultural
niche (although he does acknowledge the import-
ance of symbolically structured niches). Rather,
he thinks that basic biological resources are not
really transformed but simply dovetail to external
symbols (Clark 2008, 2011). Sterelny (2010) con-
centrates on cognitive scaffolding, but does not
think that the manipulation of symbols in public
space is constitutive of cognitive processing. The
enculturated  approach  of  CI  answers  questions
that are problematic for both Clark and Sterelny:
1. How do we learn to complete cognitive tasks
that require the manipulation of symbols in
public space?
2. Assuming  that  cognitive  processing  criss-
crosses  between  neural  space  and  public
space, how does it do this?
The first question is hard for Clark since he does
not think that our basic cognitive resources get
transformed,  at  least  in  the  way  that  I  have
presented here. The second question is hard for
Sterelny because he limits himself to a scaffolded
view of cognition rather than an extended view.
Consequently, manipulations of symbols in public
space are not cognitive processes for Sterelny.25 
CI as a process of enculturation requires a
robust  transformation  thesis.  A  robust  trans-
formation thesis is warranted by phenotypic and
neural  plasticity,  in  particular  by  learning
driven plasticity. Novel and unique public sys-
tems of representation drive the transformation
of our existing cognitive abilities. 
3.4 Novelty and uniqueness
Sometimes symbols and tools provide us with
novel functions: they radically extend our cap-
25 Or they might be assuming that Sterelny does not care either way;
in private communication Sterelny indicated that he does not think
that boundary disputes are of much interest.
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abilities in some sphere. Take the humble hand
axe. Very crude hand tools have been discovered
dating as far back as 2.6 mya (million years ago;
Toth & Schick 2006), since then there has been
evidence of a hominid capacity for cumulative
cultural  inheritance  “which  was  ultimately  to
transform Homo sapiens into the richly cultural
species  we  are  today”  (Whiten et  al. 2011).
However, the capacity for developing novel func-
tions and transmitting them to the next genera-
tion with high fidelity appears to be a more re-
cent innovation, as evidenced by the long peri-
ods of relative stability in technological develop-
ment in the early hominids and archaic humans.
It also appears to be an innovation unique to
the homonin lineage (Whiten et al. 2011). The
Oldowan period begins in the lower paleoloithic
with Homo Habilis around 2.6 mya, being taken
up by Homo Erectus and Ergaster and ending
at about 1.8 mya (Lycett & Gowlett 2008). The
tool types and process of manufacture remain
consistent during this period, with some refine-
ment  and  novelty  (Lycett &  Gowlett 2008),
where the main tool types were choppers and
scrapers or mode 1 tools (Semaw et al. 2003).
Homo Habilis is unique in that it is  the
first hominid to make tools that were made to
endure and be re-usable (it is likely that earlier
anthropocines  used  naturally-occurring  objects
as tools that were disposable; Jeffares 2010).
Oldowan toolmaking involves the produc-
tion of sharp-edged flakes by striking one
stone (the core)  with another  (the ham-
merstone). Effective flake detachment min-
imally  requires  visuomotor  coordination
and evaluation  of  core  morphology (e.g.,
angles,  surfaces)  so  that  forceful  blows
may  reliably  be  directed  to  appropriate
targets (Stout et al. 2008, p. 1940). 
There is a clear transition to Achulean techno-
logy at around 1.7 mya with the appearance of
Erectus/Ergaster.  The  main  innovation  for
Achulean technology was the bifacial handaxe—
a handheld cutting tool with two cutting sides.
The real explosion in novelty occurs in the up-
per paleoloithic period, from 50,000 years ago
(ya) to 10,000 ya (or to just before the advent
of  agriculture  and  the  neolithic  period),  with
genuine novelty in tool production and use and
cultural diversification. In this period we begin
to see evidence of art, including paintings and
sculpture, fishing, jewellery, burial, evidence of
musical activity, and all the hallmarks of beha-
viourally modern humans. It  is  in this period
that the combination of inherited cultural cap-
ital, with phenotypic and learning-driven plasti-
city, complex social relations and language res-
ults in an explosion of cultural and behavioural
diversity.
It is also in this period that we begin to
find  evidence  of  proto-numerical  and  writing
systems  as  novel  representational  innovations.
Simple tally notch systems on bone fragments
have been dated to between 35,000 and 20,000
ya,  and may have been  used for  a  variety of
purposes, the most obvious being to keep track
of economic exchanges. However, it is far easier
and  more  economical  to  keep  track  of  larger
amounts using a single symbol,  rather than a
one-to-one correspondence of marks with things.
The  complex  social  and  economic  pres-
sures that required tracking exchanges involving
increasingly large numbers would be the kind of
socio-economic pressures that produced symbol-
isation of quantity. Social and cultural pressures
can drive evolutionary novelty, in this case sym-
bolisation and uniqueness—symbolic representa-
tions are unique in both type and property, no
other animal produces written symbols to rep-
resent concepts. Symbols have unique properties
that  allow  for  operations—addition,  subtrac-
tion, multiplication, division, and so on that are
much harder (if not unlikely) without them. 
Early symbolic number systems date from
between 3000–4000 BCE, but genuinely abstract
symbol  systems  are  even  more  recent—about
1000–2000 BCE. The invention of symbol sys-
tems is too recent to be a genetic endowment,
but is inherited as cultural capital and acquired
through high-fidelity social learning (which is in
turn dependent upon neural plasticity).
The phylogeny of hominid tool-use is one
of hard-won innovation and retention. Modern
humans have developed high-fidelity modes of
transmitting cultural capital vertically and hori-
zontally. The socio-cultural pressures that led to
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humans  innovating  symbolic  representational
systems  are  unique  and  very  recent.  Fortu-
nately,  modern  human  minds  are  flexible
enough to  both  innovate  and  reliably  acquire
those innovations in ontogeny.26 This flexibility
makes modern human minds unique, and in the
case of mathematical cognition unique amongst
all our primate relatives. 
The  next  section  outlines  mathematical
cognition as a case of enculturation, and there I
will explore the example of mathematical cogni-
tion by deploying the concepts refined in  the
first two sections. 
4 Numerical cognition
In this section I outline the phylogenetic basis
of mathematical cognition. That basis is in our
shared sense of quantity and our ability to es-
timate the size of small sets by making approx-
imate judgements of the size of the set. This an-
cient endowment is the basis for our mathemat-
ical  competence,  but  it  is  not  all  there  is  to
mathematical cognition. This is because precise
mathematics  depends upon a very recent and
acquired  public  system  of  exact  and  discrete
mathematical  thinking.  The ancient  system is
analogue and approximate, but mathematics re-
quires digital  and discrete representations and
exact  operations.  These  are,  of  course,  recent
additions to inherited cognitive capital. I shall
show why mathematical cognition requires our
ancient capacity for numerosity and how it  is
constituted by cognitive practices—which trans-
form our cognitive abilities,  resulting in  novel
and unique modern human cognitive capacities.
However, this transformation results in two par-
tially  overlapping  systems—the  approximate
number system and the discrete number system
—with the latter having unique properties ac-
quired  from  cultural  innovation.  One  of  the
puzzles is how it is possible to move from an in-
herited approximate system to an acquired ex-
act  system.  The  process  of  enculturation
provides the mechanisms by which such a move
takes place, from the ancient capacity for nu-
merosity  to  development  in  a  socio-cultural
26 This section has put together a case for the flexibility of modern minds and
the ability to acquire cultural innovations quickly and easily in ontogeny.
niche, and the orchestrating role of practices in
the assembly of the cognitive systems respons-
ible for mathematical cognition. 
4.1 Numerosity in animals and humans
There  is  strong  evidence  to  suggest  that  we
have a basic analogical and non-linguistic capa-
city to recognise quantity and number. I think
that there is overwhelming evidence for an an-
cient evolutionary capacity to discriminate car-
dinality,  and to  determine  in  an  approximate
way the quantity of membership of sets.  It is
obvious how this capacity, for only very small
sets, would be beneficial for activities such as
foraging, hunting, and so on. 
Recent  studies  have  revealed  that  the
neural  populations  that  code  for  number  are
distributed in the intraparietal sulcus (Dehaene
&  Cohen 2007). A growing number of studies
show that both animals and humans possess a
rudimentary numerical competence, which is an
evolutionary  endowment.  For  example,  red-
backed salamanders have been shown to choose
the larger of two groups of live prey (Uller et al.
2003). Single neuron activation studies in rhesus
monkeys (Nieder et al. 2006) discovered that in-
dividual neurons respond to changes in number
when  presented  visually  (and  non-symbol-
lically). These neurons are also located in the
intraparietal sulci, indicating a probable cross-
species  homology.  The  neurons  peak  at  the
presentation of a specific quantity of dots, but
then decrease as the numbers presented differ
from the original. So a neuron that peaks at the
presentation of two dots responds less to three
or four dots. The further the numerical distance
of the array of dots is from the magnitude to
which the neuron is tuned, the lower the firing
rate of the neuron. Therefore, the ancient capa-
city for numerosity is an approximate function,
not a discrete one (DeCruz 2008). 
This is not yet counting; counting is exact
enumeration. Subitizing is the ability to imme-
diately recognise the size, or number, of a small
set—usually <4. Most animals subitize, rather
than count.  Infant  humans also  appear  to be
able to subitize (Rouselle &  Noël 2008). This
ancient or approximate number system (ANS)
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is a non-linguistic continuous representation27 of
quantities above 4; Dehaene calls it the number
sense  (1997).  Take  the  following  example.
Whilst it is easy enough to determine which of
the  following  two  boxes  contains  the  larger
number of dots without having to count them:
Figure 1: Subitizing or counting?
It is less easy to do so for the following
(you will probably need to resort to counting):
Figure 2: Subitizing or counting?
It is also possible to make estimations or
approximate judgements of  scale  for numbers.
Most people can quickly identify that 7 is larger
than 3. Even for more complicated exact opera-
tions we can do this:
34 + 47 = 268 (is this right?)
We readily reject this result, because the pro-
posed quantity is too distant from the operands
of the addition (Dehaene 2001, p. 28). 
34 x 47 = 1598 (is this right?)
Approximation  involving  proximity  and  dis-
tance will  not  help here (unless  you are very
practised  at  mental  multiplication),  but  you
27 The appearance of the word representation here need not raise con-
cerns; these are not representations with propositional contents and
truth conditions. They are not symbolic and are not molecular con-
stituents that can be combined to make more complex representa-
tions.
might  resort  to  a  multiplication  algorithm
(which might be routinized). It is clear that we
have an ancient sense of quantity and are good
at making judgements about more than and less
than, but when it comes to precise and discrete
quantities (particularly larger numbers) we need
new capacities to be able to make judgements
about operations on discrete numbers.
4.2 Two overlapping systems
The approximate numerical system is an ana-
logue and approximate system for discriminat-
ing non-symbolic  numerosities  greater  than 4,
but the “representations” are approximate and
noisy. The second system is acquired and con-
cerns discrete symbolic and linguistic represent-
ation of individual numbers from our numeral
system, including individual words for numbers.
This  system works  with  discrete,  exact,  sym-
bolic representations of quantity and allows for
the exact operations of arithmetic and mathem-
atics. I will call this the discrete numerical sys-
tem (DNS). There is  disagreement about how
much the two systems overlap. However, what is
clear is that the internalisation of the public nu-
meral system allows us to perform the kind of
digital  mathematical  operations  that  are  re-
quired  for  most  arithmetic  and  mathematical
operations (Nieder & Dehaene 2009, p. 197). 
Dehaene and colleagues produced a series of
experiments that demonstrate the separate func-
tioning of the two systems. Russian–English bilin-
guals were taught a set of exact and approximate
sums of two digit numbers in one of their lan-
guages (Dehaene et al. 1999, p. 970). Their tasks
were split into giving exact answers to additions
and giving an approximate answer to the addition
task. The interesting result was that: 
[w]hen  tested  on  trained  exact  addition
problems, subjects performed faster in the
teaching  language  than  in  the  untrained
language,  whether  they  were  trained  in
Russian or English. (Dehaene et al. 1999,
p. 971) 
This provided evidence that knowledge of arith-
metic was being stored in a linguistic format,
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and that there was a switching cost between the
trained and untrained languages.  By contrast,
there was equivalent performance in the approx-
imation task, and no switching cost between the
trained and untrained languages. Dehaene et al.
conclude that this provides “evidence that the
knowledge acquired by exposure to approximate
problems was stored in a language-independent
form” (1999, p. 971).
This leads us to the conclusion that there
are two overlapping, but not identical, systems
for mathematical cognition. The first is the an-
cient and approximate system, the second is a
relatively new and acquired system for discrete
and digital  representations and operations. As
Dehaene & Cohen put it: 
The model that emerges suggests that we
all possess an intuition about numbers and
a sense of quantities and of their additive
nature. Upon this central kernel of under-
standing are grafted the arbitrary cultural
symbols  of  words  and numbers  […].  The
arithmetic  intuition  that  we  inherit
through  evolution  is  continuous  and  ap-
proximate.  The  learning  of  words  and
numbers makes it digital and precise. Sym-
bols give us access to sequential algorithms
for exact calculations. (2007, p. 41)
The two systems are overlapping but not identical
because  they  have  quite  different  properties.
First, the ancient system is part of our phylogeny,
whereas the discrete system is an acquired set of
capacities in ontogeny. Second, the ancient system
is analogue and approximate, whereas the discrete
system is digital and exact. Third, the discrete
system operates on symbols that don’t map dir-
ectly on to the ancient system. 
When  we  consider  very  large  numbers,
such as 10,000,000, there is no obvious analogue
in the ANS. Consequently, large or exotic num-
bers and operations on them do not map onto
existing cortical circuitry for numerosity. Lyons
et al. (2012) call this phenomenon “symbolic es-
trangement”.  Symbols  become  estranged
through  a  process  of  symbol-to-symbol  map-
pings,  rather  than  symbol-to-approximate-
quantity mappings (Lyons et al. 2012, p. 635).
However,  there appears to be a point of
contention here: Dehaene expects there to be a
more  or  less  direct  mapping  of  symbols  to
quantities  (e.g.,  the  mental  number  line).  If
symbolic estrangement does happen, then this
would  appear  to  be  mistaken.  Lyons,  Ansari
and Beilock propose a developmental resolution
of  this  apparent  disagreement.  Children  may
start out in the acquisition of discrete number
systems by a mapping to an existing approxim-
ate neural coding of quantity, but as the system
matures and symbols  become abstracted from
the  ancient  system,  the  mature  system splits
into two (related but not entirely overlapping)
systems: neural circuitry in the DNS tunes for
discrete symbols,28 whereas circuitry in the ANS
tunes for approximate quantities, such that dis-
crete symbols do not map directly onto approx-
imate quantities. E.g., 10,000,000. The DNS has
properties that are unique.
In the next section I return to the ques-
tion of the role of practices in assembling the
DNS.
5 Mathematical practices
The  DNS  is  dependent  upon  mathematical
practices, systems of number and algorithms for
performing  mathematical  operations,  complex
mathematical concepts such as sets, functions,
and so on. None of these practices, representa-
tions, or concepts are innate, and no one seri-
ously thinks that they are. They are culturally
inherited  and  acquired  in  the  right  learning
niche with experts willing to teach. These new
abilities  are  continuous  with  our  cognitive
phylogeny. How, though, can we put the whole
package together? This section does that job. 
5.1 Cognitive practices and the 
development of mathematical 
competence
Mathematics and writing systems are examples
of  culturally evolved symbol  systems that  are
deployed to complete complex cognitive tasks.
These  systems  are  structured  by  rules  and
28 There is evidence of narrower tuning curves for Arabic numerals in
the left intraparietal sulcus (Ansari 2008).
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norms, but they are deployed as practices: pat-
terns of action spread out across a population.
In this case cognitive agents must gain mastery
over the symbols, including numerals and oper-
ators, as well as the rules for their combination.
However, they must also learn how to write and
manipulate the symbols according to those rules
in  order  to  produce  the  right  products—and
this is proceduralised. 
There  may  be  more  than  one  way  of
achieving a solution to the task. One can mul-
tiply by the partial products algorithm, or one
can use the lattice/grid method or a number of
others  that  have  been  developed  by  different
cultures using different numerical systems. How-
ever, they all involve the same set of features:
symbols, rules, operators, spatial configuration,
and  products,  and  they  jointly  constitute  a
practice for manipulating the symbols to com-
plete mathematical problems. The practices are
novel and unique to humans. 
The methods apply equally to their off-
line equivalents, so in the page-based version
of the partial products algorithm we perform
the multiplications from right to left and write
down  their  products  in  rows,  carrying  num-
bers  where  necessary.  In  the  off-line  version
we can perform the same operations on ima-
gined  numerals,  multiplying  numbers  along
the line and carrying any numbers as required.
It is cognitively taxing to hold the products of
the  multiplications  constant  in  working
memory, though some people can train them-
selves to become quite good at it. Most people
learn  off-line  multiplication  by  performing
shortcuts; if I want to work out what 25 x 7
is, I just add 25 together 7 times. 
On-line methods can change even within
the  same arithmetical  systems,  so  the  partial
products algorithm works like this: 
     23
x 11
  23 (1x3 and 1x2)
+ 230 (carry 0, 1x2 and 1x3) 
253 (add products together)
However there is an equivalent algorithm that
works like this:
   23
x   11
   200 (10 x 20)
   30 (10 x 3)
+   23 (1 x23)
  253 (add products together)
The algorithms may differ, but they still involve
the practice of spatially arranging the numerals,
and performing operations on them and deriv-
ing a product, by performing the staged manip-
ulations on the page. It appears then to matter
how we manipulate symbols in public space, but
is there any empirical evidence for this conclu-
sion?
CI predicts that it  matters how symbols
are spatially arranged when they are being ma-
nipulated.  Landy &  Goldstone (2007)  found
that college-level algebraists could be induced to
make errors by altering the layout of numbers
that they were to manipulate. They did this by
altering the spacing of the equations:
F+z * t+b = z+f * b+t 
Although minor, the extra spacing was enough
to induce errors. It matters how the symbols are
spatially laid out, for this layout is the basis of
how we manipulate those symbols. In this case
the artificial visual groups created by the irreg-
ular spacing affected the judgement of the valid-
ity of the equation. If the visual groupings were
inconsistent with valid operator precedence then
they negatively affected the judgement.29
Landy &  Goldstone’s work provides evid-
ence  that  expert  algebraists  are  practised  at
symbolic reasoning achieved via the perception
and manipulation of  physical  notations  (2007;
Landy et al. 2014). Rather than an internal sys-
tem of abstract symbols and rules for their com-
bination (i.e., a language of thought), the sys-
tem is  composed  of  perceptual-motor  systems
and the  manipulations of  numerals.  They are
careful to say that the manipulations must con-
form to the abstract norms of algebra.  Dutilh
Novaes (2013)  takes  this  to  be  evidence  that
mathematical competence is constituted by the
29 In algebra multiplications are made before additions. E.g., 5+2*6 =
17 (not 42).
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capacity to manipulate inscriptions of mathem-
atical equations. This fits very well with the CI
approach. 
Despite some interesting lacunae (savants
and  blind  mathematicians),  most  mathem-
aticians learn to manipulate numerals and other
mathematical  symbols  on  the  page,  and  they
continue to do so throughout their mature cog-
nitive  lives.  Landy  and  Goldstone’s  evidence
supports the thesis that mathematical compet-
ence is constituted, in part, by our capacity to
manipulate symbols in public space; that com-
petence is, properly, a matter of interaction. 
5.2 Continuity and transformation
We have seen that there is an ancient evolution-
ary  endowment  for  numerosity—an  analogue
and approximate system. This system is found
in other primates and other species. It provides
both  the  phylogenetic  basis  of  mathematical
cognition and the initial constraints for the de-
velopment of the DNS. The DNS did not spring
sui generis into the world. It did so because of a
heady mixture of socio-cultural pressures, phen-
otypic  and  neural  plasticity,  social  learning
strategies,  and cultural  inheritance.  These  are
the conditions for the scaffolding of the ANS,
transforming our basic biological capacities into
the DNS.
New cultural functions, discrete mathem-
atical functions, and the practices for manipu-
lating  inscriptions  transform existing  circuitry
in the brain. Once we learn how to recognise,
understand, and manipulate mathematical sym-
bols our brains undergo a profound transforma-
tion. There is a reproducible circuit for math-
ematical cognition involving a bi-lateral parietal
based approximate estimation; a left lateralised
verbal framework for arithmetic concepts (e.g.,
number words); and a occipito-temporal based
symbol recognition system (e.g., Arabic numer-
als). The system also incorporates visual-motor
systems for writing (manipulating, or pushing)
symbols in public space. 
A further important aspect of transforma-
tion is symbolic estrangement. As the DNS ma-
tures it becomes more abstract and less directly
mapped onto the approximate functions of the
ANS.  Interestingly,  at  the  same  time  expert
mathematicians become reliant upon visual-mo-
tor  capacities  for  manipulating  inscriptions.
Transformation depends upon the novelty and
uniqueness of mathematical symbols and prac-
tices. 
5.3 Novelty and uniqueness
Symbolic  number  systems  and  sequential  al-
gorithms  allow  for  mathematical  and  cognitive
novelty. Once we have a public system, all man-
ner of exotic numbers and operations can be dis-
covered:30 negative numbers,  square roots,  zero,
sets, and so on. Its importance lies in the ability
to  perform  computations  that  cannot  be  per-
formed by ancient neural functions for numeros-
ity. For example, the neural circuits responsible
for numerosity cannot (on their own) represent -3
or √54, and yet this is simply represented in terms
of public mathematical symbols (DeCruz 2008).
This is because the symbolic representations are
novel and unique. Initially, novelty results from
the pressures of  increasing social  and economic
complexity. Small roaming bands of foragers do
not  need to develop symbolic  number  systems;
post-agricultural Neolithic societies settled in vil-
lages and towns do. A further issue is how novelty
comes about from the ability to abstractly com-
bine  symbols  and  functions  that  apply  to  the
symbols. I don’t propose to try to answer that
question here; however, we might think of this as
a curiosity- and creativity-driven processes. Given
uniquely human behavioural and neural plasticity
and socio-cultural complexity we might expect an
increasing  drive  towards  cognitive  innovation.
This has certainly been the story of recent cul-
tural evolution in modern human societies. 
This concludes the discussion of mathem-
atical cognition as enculturation. Now I turn to
the objections.
6 The incredible shrinking system
Why not  just  shrink  the  cognitive  system to
brain-based systems? Is there a way to bridge
30 I will not address the issue of what discovery amounts to here and
will remain neutral on whether discovery reveals a platonic mathem-
atical system or simply the logical relations between concepts.
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the impasse between moderate and strong em-
bedding?  One  argument  concerns  whether  it
makes any difference to cognitive science to con-
sider, for example, the manipulation of public
symbols  to  be  cognitive  processes  (Sprevak
2010). Ultimately, to give a decisive answer to
that question we would need to change our con-
ception of  cognitive processes  to on-going dy-
namical interactions with the environment that
loop  through  brain,  body,  and  environment.
However,  weak  and  moderate  embedded  ap-
proaches do not work with such a conception of
cognitive process; they work with an input-pro-
cess-output  style  sandwich  model,  where  pro-
cesses supervene on bodily states and processes.
For them, there is no reason to accept strong
embedding,  and  much  of  the  discussion  has
been based around thought experiments or ab-
stract definitions rather than concrete examples.
However, even on a scaffolded view of cog-
nition we can’t deny the difference-making role
the manipulations of symbols make to the com-
pletion of cognitive tasks. Manipulating public
symbols is unique; there is a difference between
internalised strategies for completing mathemat-
ical tasks and strategies for manipulating math-
ematical  inscriptions.  Our  cognitive  capacities
cannot  cope  with  long  sequences  of  complex
symbols and operations on them. This is why
we must learn strategies and methods for writ-
ing out proofs.  Symbol  manipulation makes a
unique  difference  to  our  ability  to  complete
mathematical tasks, and we cannot simply ig-
nore their role. If we take the approach of CI,
then mathematical  cognition is  constituted by
these  bouts  of  symbol  manipulation,  and  we
cannot  simply  shrink the  system back  to  the
brain.  The  case  for  a  strongly  embedded ap-
proach to mathematical cognition depends upon
the  novelty  and  uniqueness  of  mathematical
practices and dual component transformations.
Our evolutionary endowments of numerosity are
not up to the task of exact symbolic arithmetic
and  mathematics.  Without  symbolic  number
systems and sequential algorithms there would
be  no  mathematical  innovation.  Mathematical
innovation  includes  representational  novelty:
negative numbers, square roots, zero, etc., but
also  novel  functions:  multiplication,  division,
etc. Novelty comes about from the ability to ab-
stractly combine symbols and functions that ap-
ply to the symbols.
Uniquely, symbols represent quantities dis-
cretely, but there is also the unique human ca-
pacity of manipulating symbols in public space.
We learn to manipulate symbols in public space
and we continue to do so when completing cog-
nitive tasks.
The entire system of mathematics is  not
contained in a single brain. Symbol systems are
public systems of representations and practices
for their manipulation. Mathematical practices
are part of the niche that we inherit—they are
part of our cultural inheritance.
6.1 Impermanent scaffolds?
Another objection concerns the impermenance
of  the  scaffolding  required  for  mathematical
cognition. Once we have internalised the scaf-
folding of symbolic number systems, we have no
further  need for  it,  except  for  communication
purposes. This claim would be proven if we did
not continue to manipulate numerals when com-
pleting cognitive tasks.  Even if  we think that
transformation only results in new internal rep-
resentational  resources,  and  that  this  just
amounts  to  moderate  embedding/scaffolding,
we must also concede that most mathematics is
conducted on the page. 
Scaffolding theorists, like Sterelny, can en-
dorse this idea; indeed they can agree with the
bulk  of  the  framework provided by CI whilst
avoiding the constitutive claim. What they can-
not do is deny that mathematical practice and
the manipulation of physically laid-out symbols
on the page is a difference maker for mathemat-
ical cognition. If you remove it, the ability to
complete  mathematical  tasks  drops  consider-
ably. To do so is to fly in the face of the empir-
ical evidence from psychology (Landy &  Gold-
stone 2007)  and  cognitive  neuroscience  (De-
haene &  Cohen 2007;  Ansari 2012).  Con-
sequently,  it  is  clear  that  cognitive  practices
transform  our  mathematical  abilities,  lending
weight to the CI approach.
The case I have presented in this paper is
that symbols are not simply impermanent scaf-
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folds,  they are permanent  scaffolds.  They be-
come part of the architecture of cognition (and
not simply through internalisation). Mastery of
symbol  systems  results  in  changes  to  cortical
circuitry, altering function and sensitivity to a
new, public, representational system. However,
it  also  results  in new sensori-motor capacities
for manipulating symbols in public space. The
case can be made in terms of what a symbol
system is: 
A symbol  is  a  physical  mark (or  trace),
either in physical space, or as a digital trace.
Symbol systems contain rules and practices for
interpreting symbols, for combining them, and
for  ordering  and  manipulating  them.  A large
body  of  often  tacit  practices  for  interpreting
and manipulating symbols is acquired. Scaffold-
ing is not simply an amodal symbol with an ab-
stract designation that needs to be learnt (or
mapped onto some innate symbol); scaffolding
is also how the symbols are physically arranged,
how symbols are pushed from one place to the
next in a regular fashion. Finally, scaffolding is
also how we use our own bodies, eyes, ears, and
hands to create and manipulate symbols. 
7 Conclusion
I have presented a case for CI as a process of
enculturation,  with  mathematical  cognition  as
an example of the process of enculturation at
work. I began by laying out the 4E landscape
and locating CI within it, relative to enactivism
and EM. In particular I showed how CI shares
the  interactive  stance  of  enactivism  and  the
constitutive stance of EM, but how it also dif-
fers from these. The main difference between CI
and enactivism is that CI does not equate life
and mind in the way that enactivism does. The
main difference between CI and EM is that CI
takes cultural practices to play a central role in
the assembly of cognitive systems, whereas EM
does not. 
I then went on to outline the central con-
cepts required to make sense of enculturation.
The CI framework embraces both evolutionary
continuity and transformation of  existing cog-
nitive  circuitry  in  development.  Our  modern
minds are built on archaic precursors by slow
incremental changes. However, modern humans
are behaviourally plastic and scaffolded learning
drives functional changes in our plastic brains.
The developmental change from the ANS to the
DNS  is  an  example  of  how  learning-driven
changes to cortical function result in new abilit-
ies, but this would not happen without the nov-
elty  and  uniqueness  of  mathematical  symbols
and the practices for manipulating them. 
I also countered two standard objections:
impermanence and shrinkage. The defence of CI
rested on the novelty and uniqueness of math-
ematical practices and symbols. 
If the CI framework is on the right track,
then human cognitive evolution has resulted in
minds that are flexible and interactive. Further-
more, cultural evolution has resulted in written
symbol systems and practices for manipulating
symbols that can be acquired (in development)
by minds like ours. The uniqueness of modern
human minds lies  in  their  capacity  for  trans-
formation.
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